

# A (very lacking) tech policy primer

(Not really a primer, more a set of provocations)

# whoami


5th-year Ph.D. Candidate in Cybersecurity – Northeastern University

(adv. Dave Choffnes & Christo Wilson [NU], Woody Hartzog [BU])


*M.S., Cybersecurity 2020 | B.A., Political Science & International Affairs 2017 – Northeastern*

Prior work experience in:

marketing software, legal & compliance in finance, technical writing & product mgmt in fintech




anchovy



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# whoami (caveats)

Law is a big field, CS is a big field

Privacy and design regulation focus... but also theory rather than practice

Obligatory IANAL



How do dark patterns differ across apps, mobile browsers, and web browsers (measurement and manual content analysis)? **Apps are major offenders**

Can dark patterns injuries eventually lead to redress and compensation claims in civil courts? **At present: potentially, with caveats and in limited cases**

What do users think about deceptive patterns in voice interfaces? **Not as problematic as hypothesized, but still of some concern**

What do we learn about dark patterns from IoT consumer electronics? **Amazon and Google (cameras/doorbells/speakers) are major offenders, but a holistic perspective is necessary**

# Privacy, Surveillance, and the Law

## The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Technology Trust Gap

Johanna Gunawan,\* David Choffnes,\*\* Woodrow Hartzog\*\*\* & Christo Wilson\*\*\*\*

Industry and government tried to use information technologies to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, but using the internet as a tool for disease surveillance, public health messaging, and testing logistics turned out to be a disappointment. Why weren't these efforts more effective? This Essay argues that industry and government efforts to leverage technology were doomed to fail because tech platforms have failed over the past few decades to make their tools trustworthy, and lawmakers have done little to hold these companies accountable. People cannot trust the interfaces they interact with, the devices they use, and the systems that power tech companies' services.

SHLR'21

Wash. U. LR'24

## PRIVACY NICKS: HOW THE LAW NORMALIZES SURVEILLANCE

Woodrow Hartzog,\* Evan Selinger\*\* and Johanna Gunawan\*\*\*

Privacy law is failing to protect individuals from being watched and exposed, despite stronger surveillance and data protection rules. The problem is that our rules look to social norms to set thresholds for privacy violations, but people can get used to being observed. In this article, we argue that by ignoring de minimis privacy encroachments, the law is complicit in normalizing surveillance. Privacy law helps acclimate people to being watched by ignoring smaller, more frequent, and more mundane privacy diminutions. We call these reductions "privacy nicks," like the proverbial "thousand cuts" that lead to death.

MIT Schwarzman College of Computing

SERC Case Studies '21

Case Studies in Social and Ethical Responsibilities of Computing

Regulations.gov  
Your Voice in Federal Decision Making

ProperData

Why does the law fail to protect us from surveillance capitalism? **The law ignores 'death by a thousand cuts,' which normalizes us to privacy encroachments**

Why do laypeople find it so difficult to trust emergent technologies/technological applications used in the COVID-19 public health efforts? **Trust in technology was long broken before COVID-19 uses**

## Recurring themes

- *unfairness* as asymmetries in the user experience
- translating across the design stack: *knowledge sharing* between regulators/enforcers, practitioners, and researchers



# 'Fairness' under the U.S. FTC

## Three-part test

- Substantial injury (caused or may cause)
- Unavoidable
- No countervailing benefits

# Ongoing Work

Investigatory methods for dark patterns (w. Colin Gray, Cristiana Santos, Nataliia Bielova)

- Case law analysis of dark patterns cases across EU and US; what evidence is used for audits and what methods from scholarship is necessary for DPs enforcement? What are the regulatory gaps?
- **Early findings:** DP enforcement in the US (FTC) > enforcement in the EU, but still...

Why the law fails to regulate dark patterns - gaps & **opportunities** (w. Woody Hartzog)

- Value prioritization and jurisdictional challenges

## **AI and Deceptive Designs**

- Currently: children's devices – emotion, voice, and facial rec in companion robots
- Trade puffery versus snake oil consumer claims? **AI featurization vs data minimization?**

# Future Work

How do practitioners frame persuasive designs? (w. Yixin Zou)

- Scrape and content analysis of industry guidance/thought leadership
- Expert user study


State of Auditing – towards a framework for regulators (w. Umar)

- What evidence is drawn from extant scholarship across multiple auditing types? What's been used effectively in current enforcement and what hasn't?

Modular dark patterns design study (w. Kentrell Owens, Pardis Emami-Naeini, Franziska Roesner)

- What designs do users find are more consumer/privacy protective than others?

# Lessig, *The Laws of Cyberspace*, 1998



## In Broad Strokes:

- Technology doesn't originate in a vacuum, at its roots are always purposes, values, people, communities.
- Yet technology also isn't always best understood as purely social: something special, a specific rigidity, materiality, about it.
- Technology always has effects on society, sometimes they aren't conscious.
- Technology regulates, i.e. it shapes behavior & states of affairs.
- Technology also poses specific challenges as an object of regulation.

## II. Remedy mechanisms from the GDPR

### Two tier model

### Conditions for redress

### A.82 cases

#### Two systems:

- Administrative Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) penalties framework (fines)
- **Civil law damages system in national courts (compensation for damages)**

#### Right to compensation (A.82 GDPR):

- Material damage(e.g. financial loss, see R.85 GDPR)
- **Non-material damage**

#### Conditions for compensation:

- Infringement of provisions of the GDPR
- Causal link between infringement and damages suffered

#### Approaches for assessing damages

- **Infringement alone**
- **Evidentiary threshold for damages**

# Nissenbaum, *Privacy in Context*, 2010

- Privacy is provided by appropriate flows of [information](#).
- Appropriate [information flows](#) are those that conform with contextual information norms
- Contextual informational norms refer to five independent [parameters](#): data subject, sender, recipient, information type, and transmission principle
- Conceptions of privacy are based on ethical concerns that evolve over time

EU AI Act: first regulation on artificial intelligence

**France, Germany, Italy push for 'mandatory self-regulation' for foundation models in EU's AI law**

**Big Tech braces for EU Digital Services Act regulations**