## A (very lacking) tech policy primer (Not really a primer, more a set of provocations)

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#### whoami

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




anchovy

shoyu

ebi



### whoami (caveats)

Law is a big field, CS is a big field

Privacy and design regulation focus... but also theory rather than practice

**Obligatory IANAL** 

#### Dark Patterns

TO

HIDE?

A Comparative Study of Dark Patterns Across Mobile and Web Modalities JOHANNA GUNAWAN, Northeastern University, USA AMOGH PRADEEP, Northeastern University, USA **CSCW'21** DAVID CHOFFNES, Northeastern University, USA CSI aw'22 WOODROW HARTZOG, Northeastern University, USA CHRISTO WILSON, Northeastern University, USA a person's behavior against their intenti Redress for Dark Patterns Privacy Harms? A Case Study on bsites and mobile anns, but little is known about how ations and related human vulnerabilities. In this Consent Interactions 1. mobile browser, and web browser versions of 105 s across modalities. We perform manual tests, identif-Tiburg University Tiburg, The Netherlands rrsist or differ by modality. Our findings show that INSTRUCT cross modalities, many dark patterns vary between consistent experiences of autonomy, privacy, and ns for policymakers and practitioners, and provid 1 INTRODUCTION **Exploring Deceptive Design Patterns in Voice Interfaces** KENTRELL OWENS, University of Washington, USA EuroUSEC'22 JOHANNA GUNAWAN, Northeastern University, USA DAVID CHOFFNES, Nartheastern University, USA PARTIC FMAMLINAFINI INAN Delements 1954 TADAYOSHI KOHNO, University of Washington, USA FRANZISKA ROESNER University of Workington 184 continue design patterns (semetimes called "dark patterns") are user interface design ers into behaviors that often benefit the party inclemention the design over the end user. Prior work has t already't deployed in roise interactions. This paper makes interfaces. First, we make a conceptual contribution, identifying key No deceptive design patterns, and surfacing existing and t XS Concepts - Haman centered computing -topics -- Consumer products policy Additional Key Wirels and Plenane day User: bloce Assistant, cancel ery subscriptio Voice Anistant: To manage year inducription, plane minit our webs Deceptive and manipulative design patterns (sometimes called "dark patterns")<sup>1</sup> are user interface design cleri that may trick, develop, or mislead users into behaviors that often kenefit the narty intelementian the design over the d user. For example, a service may make it easy for a user to subscribe with a single interaction, but difficult unsubscribe, or a sybsite may make it easy for a user to consent to all data collection, but difficult to out out. Whether unsupersection a weeke may make a case or a source or content to an autoconcertor, or a unitaria to apply or were the result of interactional manipulation by designers, poor design (e.g., due to a designer's habits, facily assumptions, or priorities), or other constraints of the interface, these types of design patterns make it difficult for users to make an splement the decisions they might make in response to a more privacy security finances, autonomy, and more 0 2022 Copyright held by the owner insthoto Manuscript submitted to ACM <!!! European Commission NOVEMBER 1, 2022 NOTHING

darkpatternsresearch.slack.com

AN FTC WORKSHOP

Bringing Dark Patterns to Light

#### **Understanding Dark Patterns in Home IoT Devices**

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#### ABSTRACT

CHI'23

Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are ubiquitous, but little attention has been paid to how they may incorporate dark patterns despite consumer protections and privacy concerns arising from their unique access to intimate spaces and always-on capabilities. This paper conducts a systematic investigation of dark patterns in 57 popular, diverse smart home devices. We update manual interaction and annotation methods for the



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
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#### **1 INTRODUCTION**

Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices have become ubiquitous, offering a wide range of functionality including home automation, voice assistance, media playback, video surveillance, appliances, and health monitoring. Despite extensive prior work on the security [11, 32, 57, 86, 87, 98, 100] and privacy [14, 22, 23, 27, 62-65, 85] implications of these purpose-built hardware devices, little atten-

#### tern frequency across device by Your Smart Devices Are Trying to Manipulate You With 'Dark Patterns'

Tricky interfaces in smart speakers, internet TVs, and other devices can nudge users into giving up privacy, security, and even their money



How do dark patterns differ across apps, mobile browsers, and web browsers (measurement and manual content analysis)? **Apps are major offenders** 

Can dark patterns injuries eventually lead to redress and compensation claims in civil courts? **At present: potentially, with caveats and in limited cases** 

What do users think about deceptive patterns in voice interfaces? Not as problematic as hypothesized, but still of some concern

What do we learn about dark patterns from IoT consumer electronics? **Amazon** and Google (cameras/doorbells/speakers) are major offenders, but a holistic perspective is necessary

#### Privacy, Surveillance, and the Law

The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Technology Trust Gap SHLR'21 Johanna Gunawan,\* David Choffnes,\*\* Woodrow Hartzog\*\*\* & Christo Wilson\*\*\* Industry and government tried to use information technologies to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, but using the internet as a tool for disease surveillance, public health messaging, and testing logistics turned out to be a disappointment. Why weren't these efforts more effective? This Essay argues that industry and government efforts to leverage technology were doomed to fail because tech platforms have failed over the past few decades to make their tools trustworthy, and lawmakers have done little to hold these companies accountable. People cannot trust the interfaces they interact with, the devices they use, and the systems that power tech companies' services. hat contributed to MIT Schwarzman College of Computing s. consent reaimes v. and devices that sponse is only as SERC Case Studies hnoloav concerns confidence in the good way to help ties of loyalty and of information **Case Studies in** ollection and use conclude that the Social and Ethical **Responsibilities of** Computing

'21

#### **PRIVACY NICKS: HOW THE LAW** Wash. U. LR'24 NORMALIZES SURVEILLANCE

Woodrow Hartzog,\* Evan Selinger\*\* and Johanna Gunawan\*\*\*

Privacy law is failing to protect individuals from being watched and exposed, despite stronger surveillance and data protection rules. The problem is that our rules look to social norms to set thresholds for privacy violations, but people can get used to being observed. In this article, we argue that by ignoring de minimis privacy encroachments, the law is complicit in normalizing surveillance. Privacy law helps acclimate people to being watched by ignoring smaller, more frequent, and more mundane privacy diminutions. We call these reductions "privacy nicks," like the proverbial "thousand cuts" that lead to death.



# Why does the law fail to protect us from surveillance capitalism? **The law ignores 'death by a thousand cuts,' which normalizes us to privacy encroachments**

Why do laypeople find it so difficult to trust emergent technologies/technological applications used in the COVID-19 public health efforts? **Trust in technology was long broken before COVID-19 uses** 

### Recurring themes

- *unfairness* as asymmetries in the user experience
- translating across the design stack: *knowledge sharing* between regulators/enforcers, practitioners, and researchers

### 'Fairness' under the U.S. FTC

Three-part test

- Substantial injury (caused or may cause)
- Unavoidable
- No countervailing benefits

## Ongoing Work

Investigatory methods for dark patterns (w. Colin Gray, Cristiana Santos, Nataliia Bielova)

- Case law analysis of dark patterns cases across EU and US; what evidence is used for audits and what methods from scholarship is necessary for DPs enforcement? What are the regulatory gaps?
- Early findings: DP enforcement in the US (FTC) > enforcement in the EU, but still...

Why the law fails to regulate dark patterns - gaps & opportunities (w. Woody Hartzog)

• Value prioritization and jurisdictional challenges

#### **AI and Deceptive Designs**

- Currently: children's devices emotion, voice, and facial rec in companion robots
- Trade puffery versus snake oil consumer claims? Al featurization vs data minimization?

### Future Work

How do practitioners frame persuasive designs? (w. Yixin Zou)

- Scrape and content analysis of industry guidance/thought leadership
- Expert user study


State of Auditing – towards a framework for regulators (w. Umar)

• What evidence is drawn from extant scholarship across multiple auditing types? What's been used effectively in current enforcement and what hasn't?

Modular dark patterns design study (w. Kentrell Owens, Pardis Emami-Naeini, Franziska Roesner)

• What designs do users find are more consumer/privacy protective than others?

### Lessig, The Laws of Cyberspace, 1998



### In Broad Strokes:

- Technology doesn't originate in a vacuum, at its roots are always purposes, values, people, communities.
- Yet technology also isn't always best understood as purely social: something special, a specific rigidity, materiality, about it.
- Technology always has effects on society, sometimes they aren't conscious.
- Technology regulates, i.e. it shapes behavior & states of affairs.
- Technology also poses specific challenges as an object of regulation.

#### II. Remedy mechanisms from the GDPR

Two tier model

Conditions for redress

A.82 cases

Two systems:

 Administrative Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) penalties framework (fines) Right to compensation (A.82 GDPR):

- Material damage(e.g. financial loss, see R.85 GDPR)
- Non-material damage

Approaches for assessing damages

- Infringement alone
- Evidentiary threshold for damages

Civil law damages system in Connational courts
(compensation for damages)

#### in Conditions for compensation:

- Infringement of provisions of the GDPR
- Causal link between infringement and damages suffered

### Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context, 2010

- Privacy is provided by appropriate flows of information.
- Appropriate information flows are those that conform with contextual information norms
- Contextual informational norms refer to five independent <u>parameters</u>: data subject, sender, recipient, information type, and transmission principle
- Conceptions of privacy are based on ethical concerns that evolve over time

EU AI Act: first regulation on artificial intelligence

# France, Germany, Italy push for 'mandatory self-regulation' for foundation models in EU's AI law

# Big Tech braces for EU Digital Services Act regulations